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I. THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATION
A. The Character of Water Rights.
Water rights are an unusual form of property right. 
They do not arise from and are not defined in patents or 
instruments of grant; they rather arise by claim, by seizure 
and by application of water to beneficial use. They are 
transferable as interests in real property but have no tang­
ible physical properties. They are only components of an 
ever-changing and interrelated regimen of precipitation, flow, 
storage, diversion, consumption and return flows. Their 
existence and value is wholly dependent upon (i) their 
recognition by custom and state law, (ii) the ability of the 
claimant to divert water from the source of supply in priority 
without interference by others, and (iii) the ability of the 
claimant to prohibit diversions by others at times and in 
amounts that impair delivery of water to the point of 
diversion.
To the extent that the right is recognized by state 
law, it is clear that the individual has a legal right to 
protect his interest but, as a practical matter, cannot do so 
physically and economically without cooperative action.
Unlike more traditional forms of property, a water right can-
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not be protected by building a fence or placing it in a 
safe. The usufructuary nature of the right necessarily 
exposes all water rights to dimunition by the wrongful acts of 
others. This potential for injury can only be prevented by 
the constant supervision or administration of every water 
right in a given basin. Accordingly, the proper administra­
tion of all water rights lies at the core of each property 
right. With it, the right has value and utility; without it, 
water is no more than ferae naturae, subject to capture by 
force or stream location.
B. The Role of the State.
The state's responsibility for administration of 
water rights is frequently misconceived. It does not rest on 
a passive role as proprietor and grantor with ministerial 
functions to allocate and deliver water pursuant to rights 
created by state action. Rather, it stems from the state's 
role as sovereign and rests on a duty to administer the 
resource similar to the fiduciary responsibility of a trustee.
The waters of the western United States were owned 
initially by the federal government by cession from foreign 
powers. By the Act of 1866,1/ Congress authorized the 
transfer of rights to individuals to the extent they are 
recognized by local custom and state law. In Article XVI,
1/ 30 U.S.C. § 5; 43 U.S.C. § 661
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Section 5 of its constitution,2/ Colorado declared that all of 
the waters of natural streams are the property of the public 
and dedicated to public use. By such declaration with respect 
to waters in which it had no proprietary interest, the state 
assumed a trusteeship role to administer the waters of the 
state for the benefit of the public.3/ As such, it became 
responsible not only for minimal administrative functions but 
also for administration of the kind a trustee owes to the 
beneficiary of the trust. Its responsibilities include, first 
and foremost, the conservation of the estate and avoidance of 
waste; second, the promotion of beneficial use by assisting 
the appropriator in achieving use objectives to the maximum 
extent feasible; third, the representation of beneficiaries in 
a parens patriae capacity and maintaining the use regimen on 
the river system; and fourth, the promotion of efficiency and 
prudence of the kind expected of a trustee.
2/ Colo. Const., Art. XVI, Section 5 states that:
Water of streams public property. The
water of every natural stream, not 
heretofore appropriated, within the state 
of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the 
property of the public, and the same is 
dedicated to the use of the people of the 
state, subject to appropriation as 
hereinafter provided.
3/ But see People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 
(1979), where the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that public access to waters flowing in nonnavigable streams 
was justified by the fact that the state serves as a trustee 
of these waters.
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C. Criteria for Judging Administrative 
Responsibility.
If water is administered in a ministerial capacity 
only, it is susceptible to use, particularly in agricultural 
and grazing basins, with little regard for conservation and 
maximization of benefits. If administration is viewed, 
however, as a fiduciary responsibility, the role of the state 
is not limited to the determination of priorities and 
allocation of water pursuant to such priorities, but further 
includes: (i) the obligation to undertake a continuous study
of hydrological conditions throughout the basin or aquifer and 
the development of a databank for use in the administration 
and adjudication of water rights; (ii) a responsibility for 
objectively assessing proposed changes in use to determine 
whether other rights would be adversely affected;
(iii) assisting water users seeking changes in points of 
diversion or place of use to structure a program to achieve 
the desired change without impairment of the common source of 
supply; (iv) taking action on behalf of user beneficiaries 
generally to require terms and conditions for protection of 
the regimen of flow and use; and (v) making technically- 
qualified hearing officers responsible for initial determina­
tions with respect to issues which involve matters of tech­
nical expertise. The performance of these duties would be 
aided considerably by the development of an official state 
policy on the relevant water rights issues.
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Consider whether Colorado's administration of water 
rights meets this standard. Is its system of administration a 
product of historic accident, addressing only ministerial 
functions and leaving to the user the responsibility, high 
cost and inefficiency of protecting rights in a common source 
of supply?
II. COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.
A. Historic Patterns.
Prior to 1969, state administration of water rights 
was limited to the enforcement of court decrees. These 
decrees were entered in proceedings resembling an action for a 
declaratory judgment which determined that water had been 
diverted from the source of supply and applied to beneficial 
use.4/ The decrees also recognized, as a benchmark for 
priority purposes, the date the intent to appropriate was 
first manifested on the ground.5/ The State Engineer was 
responsible for the administration of the decrees, which was 
achieved through water commissioners in each of 70 water 
districts. The water commissioners had authority to 
administer calls on the basis of priority lists, to check
4/ See C.R.S. 1963 § 148-9-1 et seq.
5/ See, e.g., Elk Rifle Water Company v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 
438, 484 P .2d 1211 (1971).
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headgates and to maintain records of diversions.6/ Other 
functions performed by the office of the State Engineer were 
only collateral to water administration, e .g ., approving 
reservoir design for safety,7/ metering temporary exchanges 8/ 
and rating flumes and weirs.9/
Adjudications generally were personal to the appro- 
priator; they were a vehicle for him to fix the date and 
quantity of his water right and locate the point of diver­
sion. Change proceedings occurred only for alterations in the 
point of diversion, i.e ., for modification of the decree, and 
rarely drew opposition from other water right owners. No 
proceedings were prescribed by law or were in fact required 
for changing the place and character of use or increasing the 
consumptive use of water. Under this system, expanded uses 
which were undetected by the state or other water users were 
transformed by the magic of time into "historic uses." Not 
until 1943 was there any formal procedure for such changes or 
was provision made for securing jurisdiction over all poten­
tial claimants to water from the common source by publication
6/ See C.R.S. 1963 § 148-15-1 et seq. 
7/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-87-105.
8/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-83-101 et seq.
9/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-84-114.
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of notice rather than personal service upon the water 
users.10/
No provision was made in the 1943 Act to bring the 
State Engineer into the adjudication process; it left him only 
with the minimal data collection powers granted to him in the 
initial legislation of 1889.11/ The Act applied only to 
waters of natural streams and did not encompass wells hydrau­
lically connected to streams or nontributary aquifers. 
Adjudications continued to be held on each stream system, some 
extending over many years. Both statute and case law provided 
that no rights adjudicated in a supplemental proceeding could 
predate the junior priority in a prior proceeding,12/ which 
allowed users with previously adjudicated rights to ignore 
subsequent proceedings unless or until a change occurred in 
the source of supply. This system worked relatively well when 
changes of existing water rights were infrequent; the priority 
doctrine automatically assured owners of senior rights that 
they would not be adversely affected by new water rights. If, 
however, an application to change an existing decree could or 
would affect an appropriator's source of supply, he had the 
responsibility of going to court in a private proceeding. It
10/ C.R.S. 1953 § 147-9-5.
11/ C.R.S. 1953 § 147-11-1 et seq.
12/ C.R.S. 1953 § 147-9-13; Hardesty Reservoir, Canal and 
Land Company v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet and Irrigated Land 
Company, 85 Colo. 555, 277 P 763 (1929); The United States of 
America v. The District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 
169 Colo. 555, 458 P.2d 760 (1969).
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should be noted that there was relatively little need for an 
efficient mechanism for reviewing and approving changes of 
water rights because such changes were relatively infrequent 
and simple when compared to those of today.
This judicial method of determination and enforcement 
of rights has become unique. Only Montana and Idaho had 
similar systems , 13/ where waters were plentiful and regulation 
unnecessary. Both states later rejected such procedures when 
increased demands on the resource created the need for effec­
tive administration. Today Colorado stands alone with such a 
procedure; it arose by accident, not by planning, and has not 
been reviewed and revised when the regimen of use has changed 
from plenty to scarcity, and the focus has shifted from the 
acquisition of new rights to the change and management of 
existing water rights.
B . Inadequacies First Noted.
Three developments in the 1950s and 1960s exposed the 
inadequacies of the existing system. The first development 
was a recognition that substantial quantities of undeveloped 
water lay in deep nontributary aquifers which could be mined 
over limited time periods. The use of this resource presented 
issues that were not addressed by existing law and not resolv­
able by reference to traditional priority concepts. Moreover, 
the physical location and nature of this water required sub-
13/ R.C.M. 1947 §§ 89-829, 89-836 (Repl. Vol. 6, part 1]. 
Idaho
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stantial hydrological data to quantify the amount of water 
available in the aquifer and determine the effects of develop­
ment and the impact of administration.
Second, with the coming of rural electric power, a 
plethora of wells were dug in the alluvial aquifers. They 
were not initially perceived to have a direct impact on river 
flows. They were not subject to adjudication or to priority 
administration under existing legislation. As a result of this 
lack of regulation, an entire economy developed on the basis 
of well water supply before the impact of these wells on 
stream flows was identified. These unadministered tributary 
wells threatened the very fabric of the constitutionally 
mandated doctrine of prior appropriation. The wells were 
diverting and consumptively using water out of priority, which 
resulted in injury to senior water rights. A strict 
application of existing laws would require that all of these 
wells be shut down permanently. However, the economic 
ramifications of this potential solution created extraordinary 
political pressure to resolve the problem without taking the 
drastic step of shutting down the many unadministered and 
unadjudicated wells.
The third development was the post-World War II 
migration of people to Colorado's front range. This demo­
graphic shift created unprecedented demands for water for 
municipal and industrial purposes. Because existing water 
supplies were largely held by the agricultural sector, farms 
and ranches became the source of the water for this new
-9-
growth. A market for water separate from the land arose, and 
changes in use as well as changes in points of diversion 
became common. However, many of these changes were defacto 
and without accommodation under existing law. While courts 
had previously made determinations on application of users as 
to priority date and quantity of use, little attention had 
been paid to the impact of changes in use on return flows.
New focus was given by engineers to the issues of consumptive 
use, on farm efficiency, evapotranspiration losses and 
transmissivity of aquifers, and water administration became a 
highly technical art.
C. Legislative Responses.
The legislative response to the discovery and 
development of nontributary groundwater was two-fold. First, 
the legislature enacted H.B. 1066 in 1965 14/ to mandate the 
regulation of wells in accordance with their priorities, and 
second, it enacted a Ground Water Management Act 15/ which 
created a nontechnical ground water commission to designate 
nontributary ground water basins, approve establishment of 
local management districts and regulate well permits for uses 
within such basins. This legislation mandated a level of 
administration in law that was not possible in fact. While an 
integrated body of water in a stream can be allocated in 
priority by opening and closing headgates, the low
14/ C.R.S. 1963, supp. § 148-11-22.
transmissivity rate of water in ground water aquifers makes it 
impossible to allocate water in priority by regulation of 
rates of well pumping. Moreover, the time lag between ground 
water withdrawal and stream impact may be so long that water 
cannot be made available to meet stream calls by curtailing 
diversions from wells. The void between theory and fact 
quickly created problems; the first attempt to curtail pumping 
from particular wells was found to be arbitrary and capricious 
in Fellhauer v. People 16/ as the Fellhauer well was senior to 
other wells from the same aquifer that were not curtailed.
The Ground Water Management Act recognized that non­
tributary waters may exist and that they should be adminis­
tered on a basin-by-basin basis. But, largely for political 
reasons, no administrative machinery was put in place to 
implement the mandates of the Act. The State Engineer, to be 
sure, was made an ex officio member of the Commission,17/ but 
was given no regulatory authority. Boundaries of aquifers 
were set by application without reference to or knowledge of 
actual hydrological conditions. In fact, the definition of 
designated groundwater included groundwater that was "not 
adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein 
groundwater withdrawals have constituted the principal water 
usage for fifteen years preceding January 1, 1965."18/ When a
16/ 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
17/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-90-103(6).
18/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-90-103(6).
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basin was designated, levels of historic division were given 
priority regardless of aquifer limitations;19/ and new uses of 
nontributary groundwaters outside of designated basins were 
restricted to projections of the lifetime yield in and under 
the land owned by or permitted to the user.20/
While the 1965 Act attempted to solve the problems 
surrounding the use of nontributary groundwater, the Act did 
not address the other two developments identified above, in 
that it offered no solution for the problems created by the 
tributary wells and the recently created need for changes in 
existing decrees to accommodate new and different uses of the 
water resource. In response, the General Assembly in 1967 21/ 
directed the Director of the Division of Water Resources
(i) to investigate relationships in areas where intermingled 
surface and groundwater are used in conjunction with each 
other for irrigation; (ii) to employ such technical, legal and 
practical assistance as may be reasonably required to deter­
mine the need for and content of legislation that would pro­
vide for integrated administration of all diversions and uses 
of the water within the state; (iii) to review existing water 
laws to determine their sufficiency and the need for any modi­
fications or supplementations thereto in order to provide an 
effective system of administration; and (iv) to present a
19/ C.R.S, 1973 §§ 37-90-102, 37-90-106(1)(f). 
20/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-90-137(4).
21/ C.R.S. 1963 § 148-2-9.
-12-
report, recommendations and proposed legislation to the 47th 
General Assembly. Public hearings were held, hydrological 
studies of surface-groundwater relationships were completed by 
consulting engineers and analyses of legislative needs and 
proposed changes were made by private water attorneys.
Neither the State Engineer's office, the Attorney General's 
office nor the Colorado Water Conservation Board were given 
specific responsibilities.
Although consideration of administrative systems of 
other states may have occurred in the course of the investiga­
tions, the resulting report recommended, and the legislature 
passed, an act 22/ which (i) preserved the judicial system for 
determination of priorities; (ii) extended that system to the 
determination of hydrological issues raised by changes in 
place and character of use; (iii) changed the adjudication 
process from periodic adjudications to a continous 
adjudication process; and (iv) limited the State Engineer's 
role essentially to administration of decrees and to a series 
of administrative actions in connection with the granting of 
well permits, approval of augmentation programs and 
preparation of a tabulation of priorities that would all 
require, with or without contest, an independent determination 
in court.
In place of delegating authority to the State
22/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-101 et seq., known as the Water Right 
Determination and Administration Act of 1969.
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Engineer to make determinations as to hydrological fact and 
approve or disapprove applications of water users for changes 
in point of diversion or place and character of use, the Act
(i) required all existing wells to be filed for adjudication 
by the Water Court not later than July 1, 1972;23/
(ii) provided that a regimen of pumping that had continued for 
18 years would be recognized in the tabulations , 24/ and
(iii) only allowed the state to participate in proceedings for 
a change of the water right as an adversary or an applicant.
The 1969 Act, and subsequent amendments, did not 
dispense with the need for both a well permit from the State 
Engineer and a decree from the water court.25/ Thus, the 
rights determined on application for a well permit are subject 
to independent adjudication in the water court, and the water 
right decreed may be different from that initially granted by 
the State Engineer.
The legislative solution to the problem created by 
the existing tributary wells was contained in the 1969 Act, 
which recognized and allowed "plans for augmentation"26/; 
alternate points of diversion at the wellhead for stream 
priorities; and permitted the State Engineer to limit
23/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-306.
24/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-401(1)(b)(VI).
25/ See C.R.S. 1963 § 148-18-36(3); repealed in 1971 and 
replaced by an amendment to what is now C.R.S. 1973 
§ 37-90-132(2).
26/ C.R.S. 1973 §37-92-103(9).
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diversions by regulation to the extent required for protection 
of vested rights in the basin. Although the State Engineer 
promulgated regulations, they had to be approved, if 
contested, in the water court and essentially all the 
determinations pertinent to the integration of well and 
surface diversions were left to the costly, time-consuming and 
inefficient procedures of the water court.
Finally, the evaluation of impacts resulting from 
changes in use, which is essentially an analysis of 
hydological and engineering factors, was relegated once more 
to the water court. No provisions were made for the exercise 
of any state responsibility for protecting vested rights, or 
for the use of the data base accumulated in the State 
Engineer's office. Accordingly, each water user continued to 
have the responsibility to make technical investigations and 
retain engineers and legal counsel to represent him on a
-15-
continuing basis before the water court in order to protect 
his "vested" right from injury.
D. Nontributary Aquifers.
The 1969 Act, however, only pertained to constitu­
tional appropriations, i.e., to waters in aquifers hydrauli­
cally connected to a natural stream. Outside of the 
recognized alluvial boundaries, groundwater areas could be 
delineated and placed in a designated groundwater basin. 
Several such basins were in fact designated on the high plains 
in eastern Colorado and have been administered unchanged under 
the management of the Ground Water Commission and the board of 
directors of the appropriate management district. No such 
basins, however, were established on the western slope, in the 
San Luis valley nor, most significantly, in the broad Denver 
basin extending along the front range from Colorado Springs to 
Loveland. By a 1973 amendment, well permits outside of a 
designated basin were limited to the owner of the land or to 
one with the authorization of the owner, and conferred an 
almost absolute right to withdraw water within the boundaries 
of the property at such a rate that the aquifer feeding the 
well would not be exhausted for 100 years.30/
If the basins were nontributary to any stream system 
in fact, and if the basin yield over a 100-year period could 
be established with any reasonable level of predictability,
30/ This provision was commonly referred to as Senate Bill 
213, and was codified at C.R.S. § 37-90-137(4).
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the theory behind the legislative regulation, being essen­
tially the same as that established in designated basins, was 
theoretically sound. The flaws in this approach, however, are 
readily apparent. First, the right is adjudicated in the 
water court on evidence of nontributary status and aquifer 
characteristics presented in an adversary proceeding. True, 
the State Engineer is authorized to make that determination 
but it cannot be made in fact on an ad hoc basis without first 
determining the boundaries of an aquifer as a whole, the 
recharge the aquifer may in fact have through faults from 
surface or stream supplies and discharge by faults into a 
river drainage system. Second, once fixed by decree the right 
is absolute and does not change with the hydrological data 
that may be developed from other well logs and studies of 
aquifer effects from aggregate pumping rates. Third, the 
decree limits the right to appropriate and divert available 
water that might migrate, in consequence of withdrawals, from 
tract to tract.
E. The Huston Case.
In 1969 John Huston and others put the system at 
issue by making appropriations of nontributary groundwater 
throughout the state. Adjudications of claims were mandated 
under law on a tract-by-tract basis in the several water divi­
sions and separate water courts. The cases were consolidated 
by order of the Supreme Court under a special water judge and 
several key issues were stipulated for preliminary determina­
tion by the Court. Finally, in 1983, the Supreme Court
-17-
rendered a decision 31/ that nontributary waters were not 
subject to adjudication prospectively in the water court 
(although it recognized existing decrees), and provided that 
such waters were subject to such prescriptions as the General 
Assembly might provide. The Governor responded with a 
directive to the Director of Natural Resources to make a 
thorough study of alternative administration systems for such 
waters and make recommendations to an interim committee of the 
General Assembly.32/ The studies were made, the report was 
filed and the General Assembly once more enacted a band-aid- 
type statute in Senate Bill 5 in 1985.33/
F. Senate Bill 5
Senate Bill 5 provided that (i) nontributary waters 
shall not be subject to appropriation; (ii) such waters shall 
be allocated on the basis of ownership of overlying land;
(iii) augmentation to the stream system is required on a for­
mula basis in all cases, with special provisions for the 
various Denver aquifers; and (iv) the findings of the State 
Engineer regarding well permit applications in the Denver 
Basin aquifers only are reviewable in the water court pursuant 
to modified provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
While this process continues the need for adjudi-
31/ State of Colorado v. Southwestern Colorado Water 
Conservation District, 671 P.2d 1294 (Colo. 1983).
32 /
33/ Senate Bill 5 was signed into law bythe Governor on 
June 6, 1985.
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cation of water rights by the water courts, and does not adopt 
an administrative system for the allocation of water rights, 
it does permit the State Engineer to prescribe, by regulation, 
guidelines for definition of nontributary waters and 
withdrawal limits. The State Engineer is authorized to make 
determinations as to augmentation requirements, to exercise 
threshold discretion in granting well permits and make 
extensions on good cause shown, and to determine rates of 
withdrawal on the basis of a 100-year aquifer life for 
specified Denver Basin formations. He can also impose terms 
and conditions for protection of vested rights and determine 
the existence and extent of nontributary aquifers.
This increased participation by the state, acting 
through the State Engineer, is a significant step by Colorado 
towards meeting its fiduciary duty to administer water rights 
in a coordinated and efficient manner. Yet, once more, polit­
ical self-interest has qualified the State Engineer's power in 
ways that may increase water court litigation and lose the 
administrative benefits prescribed by the Act. In particular, 
the Act (i) gives special treatment throughout to the Denver
-19-
Basin aquifers,34/ (ii) grants special rights to 
municipalities who provide water service to overlying lands 
and by ordinance create a presumption of consent that the 
owner has allocated underground supplies to municipal use, and 
(iii) allows the decisions of the State Engineer to be 
reversed or modified by judicial review. Moreover, with 
respect to the Denver Basin aquifers, the Act specifically 
limits the range in which administrative discretion can be 
exercised, and requires an assumption that hydrostatic 
pressures have been abated in calculating the impact of 
withdrawals from such aquifers in the 100-year projections 
made.
The Act also stops far short of addressing all of the 
problems with the existing system for allocation and 
administration of nontributary water rights. Senate Bill 5:
(1) raises constitutional questions by attempting to 
subject admittedly tributary waters to allocation on the basis 
of overlying land ownership. This method of allocation 
conflicts with the constitutional right to appropriate 
tributary waters of the state;35/; (2) continues the 
requirement that every groundwater right outside of a 
designated groundwater basin go through a formal adjudication
34/ The Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, Laramie-Fox Hills and 
Dakota aquifers are considered to be part of the Denver Basin.
35/ The Huston decision certainly did not provide a 
foundation for excluding other than nontributary water from 
the appropriation system.
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proceeding in the water court. These proceedings are in large 
part duplicative of the factual investigations, evidentiary 
proceedings and findings now required of the State Engineer, 
and continues the present inefficient process of submitting, 
in an adversarial setting, complex hydrological issues to a 
non-technical decision maker; (3) negates any appropriative 
right to nontributary waters, implicitly confirms the 
existence of a proprietary right and proceeds to limit such 
right on an arbitrary and non-uniform basis throughout the 
state; (4) provides different appeal procedures for Denver 
Basin administrative actions than for comparable actions in 
other basins in the state; (5) allows extension of well 
permits only in the Denver Basin and thereby continues "use it 
or lose it" conditions throughout the remainder of the state;
(6) permits aquifer status to be determined as of the date of 
the permit, and assumes that this status continues 
notwithstanding the fact that changes in the aquifer may 
result from depletions caused by existing wells. This 
provision ultimately allows landowners who first acquire 
permits to impair the correlative rights of neighbors;
(7) presumes consent by landowners to mine drainage programs 
even though the effect of the mine drainage may be to deplete 
groundwater resources under the owner's land without 
compensation; (8) allows municipal entities to take, without 
showing the existence of an overriding public intent and 
without the payment of just compensation, nontributary 
groundwater which belongs to the overlying landowners; and
-21-
(9) constitutes special legislation for Denver Basin aquifers 
which goes byond any privilege based on unique conditions, 
e.g ., differing augmentation obligation and ceilings and 
differing regulatory procedures.
In sum, Senate Bill 5 was a glaring exercise of 
political self-interest, providing wholly superficial 
protection to developers, municipalities, mining interests, 
existing groundwater basins and management districts and a 
broad class of persons with vested rights in the adjudication 
system. The legislature lost an opportunity given by the 
Supreme Court in the Huston case to put in place a tested 
program for regulation and use of the state's critical 
groundwater resources.
III. CRITIQUE OF SYSTEM.
Such is the Colorado system. Does it meet the tests 
prescribed for a sound system of administration? It does 
provide a vehicle for all the ministerial functions for all 
kinds of water rights, i.e., it determines the existence, 
point of diversion, and quantity and character of use in such 
a form that the right can be administered.
A. Need for Judicial Proceeding.
But is there any rational basis for continuing to 
require these kinds of determinations to be made routinely in 
costly judicial proceedings? Perhaps more pertinent is the 
question whether any need exists for requiring present and 
potential holders of rights in a common source of supply to \ 
police the initiation and perfection of rights of other
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appropriators. Historically, prior to the 1969 Act, a 
judicial proceeding may have had its place to establish 
historic facts relating to the intent to appropriate, the time 
when water was claimed, diverted and applied to beneficial 
use, the appropriate quantity of flow appropriated and the use 
to which it was put. These were all evidentiary matters which 
were susceptible to determination on the basis of nontechnical 
findings of fact. Moreover, since multiple rights were 
adjudicated in the same proceeding, it was inevitable that 
questions would arise as to the appropriate priority date.
But consider the changes wrought by the 1969 Act. 
Under the new system, historical inquiries are limited by the 
yearly adjudications. The most important issues in the 
adjudication of a water right are the determination of the 
tributary or nontributary nature of the source of supply and 
the need for augmentation of out of priority diversions. Both 
are technical or hydrological issues which can be determined 
in the first instance by the State Engineer.
Where a conditional decree is first given, the appro- 
priator must return from time to time to show diligence 36/ or 
to establish that his right has become absolute. The latter 
issue is ministerial and could be determined by the filing of 
a report with inspection by the water commissioner to show 
compliance. The former is the source of extensive contested 
water court litigation, where decrees are continued from
36/ C.R.S. § 37-92-301(4).
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period to period on assertions of diligence and stipulations 
with objectors. The diligence standard in Colorado is far too 
ephemeral and far too subject to distortion and abuse. In 
other states where rights arise by permit, the permit will 
specify a time when work is to be completed or parts of work 
are to be performed. Where events of force majeure make it 
impractical to meet permit deadlines, extensions can be 
procured, with consideration for intervening rights of other 
appropriators. Determinations by the State Engineer can be 
appealed to a court and judicial determinations made in those 
cases where contests may exist. Query whether any purpose is 
served (i) by putting responsibility on individual water users 
to challenge diligence in the first instance or, to avoid the 
cost of trial, to stipulate for continuation of right on 
specified conditions, or (ii) by requiring a judicial 
proceeding, with notice and potential objections, for merely 
putting in decree format the claims of an applicant set out in 
his application. Significant court time could be saved and 
costs to water users reduced if these matters could be found 
administratively, with right of review for any person who 
believes that an administrative decision is arbitrary or 
capricious.
B. Allocation Mechanics.
Consider next how effective the Colorado administra­
tive system is in monitoring allocations of water in accor­
dance with decreed priorities. Division engineers and their 
assistants (referred to as "water commissioners") make daily
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determinations of river flows at various measurement points, 
determine the priority dates of appropriations that may take 
water,37/ and regulate headgate diversions to meet downstream 
calls. Although they are charged with preventing waste of 
water,38/ they have historically asserted no control over the 
allocation and use of water below the headgate, and in fact do 
not have acre-foot allocation figures in the decrees 
administered (except where change proceedings have occurred) 
to permit nonarbitrary regulation of use.
But in an age of growing water scarcity, this kind of 
abstract regulation by dates and rates of flow is wholly 
inadequate. In arid regions there is a natural inclination to 
divert, regardless of actual crop needs, the full amount of a 
water right whenever it is available. Statistics of aggregate 
headgate diversions and acres of irrigated lands reveal a 
variance in rates of water application, with some irrigators 
using as much as six acre-feet per acre. Although the waste 
water may be returned to the stream through wasteways or 
percolation to alluvial aquifers, the excess diversion may 
delay the time when available water in the stream can be 
delivered to headgates of downstream appropriators.
These inefficient uses of water can be prevented by 
the implementation of a system which allows effective 
monitoring of water diversions. All ditches should be
37/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-501, 502. 
38/ C.R.S. 1973 § 37-92-502(2).
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required to file with the division engineer at the start of an 
irrigation season the number of acres to be irrigated, the 
calculated ditch and field losses that are reasonable for 
application, the calculated consumptive use for the crops 
grown and an estimate of the maximum water requirements (in 
absence of precipitation) for the ditch operation. Water 
users could then be required to maintain timely records of 
acre-foot diversions as well as second-foot rates of flow and 
be required to report this information on a monthly basis to 
the division engineer or water commissioner. Where ditches, 
on the basis of such reports, are using water at a higher rate 
than requirements, the appropriate water official should be 
authorized to designate such ditches as critical, monitor uses 
below the headgate, impose penalties on the ditch, or give 
notice to junior ditches to monitor excessive diversions.
Such a system would create consciousness of waste, impose 
reasonable management requirements on ditch administrations,
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and facilitate exercise of authority now vested in the 
division engineers to conserve the available supplies.39/
Although the foregoing discussion focuses on ditch 
diversions, the same kind of monitoring is now authorized and 
is necessary for tributary wells, particularly where they are 
subject to a limited pumping regime and powered by windmills 
and gas engines not susceptible to withdrawal estimates. In 
both cases, penalties for erroneous reporting, or out-of­
priority diverting, should be increased and summary action 
should be available to administrators to assure proper 
compliance.
39/ Legal support for increased regulation of waste is 
inherent in existing water law: the right to appropriate 
exists only for beneficial uses, which by definition excludes 
waste. The practical application of this concept has been 
referred to in western water law as the "duty of water." 
Reference to this concept can be found in the case law of many 
states, and it referred to the presumption that a given amount 
of water should be sufficient to irrigate a fixed amount of 
land. See Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of 
Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); Taylor v. Tempe 
Irrigatory Canal Company, 21 Ariz. 574, 193 P. 12 (1920); 
California Pastoral and Agricultural Company, Ltd, v. The 
Madera Council and Irrigation Company, 176 Cal. 78 
(Calif. 1914); Basin Electric Power Cooperative v. State 
Board of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (1978); State ex rel 
Reynolds v. Mears, 86 N.M. 510, 525 P.2d 870 (1974). While 
this restriction is not new, in Colorado it is only applied 
when an appropriator seeks a change in point of use of water 
right. If, however, this concept were to be applied to all 
diversions, regardless of whether they had been the subject of 
a change application, excess diversions could be prevented. 
This establishment of a duty of water, which would be 
equivalent to the quantification of beneficial uses, should 
logically be accomplished through a rulemaking by the State 
Engineer.
-27-
c. Changes of Use.
Consider next how effective the Colorado system is in 
protecting existing rights from the effects of expanded uses 
by others or alterations in stream flow resulting from the 
many changes made in points of diversion and places and 
character of use. These matters are now committed to the 
jurisdiction of the water court. State Engineer participation 
is limited to a report of the division engineer to the referee 
or water judge unless the State files a statement of 
opposition and thereby obtains party status. Change 
proceedings are typically contested and rest upon extensive 
factual presentations or stipulations between applicant and 
objectors with respect to acceptable terms and conditions.
The processing of these matters through the water 
court has worked well, subject nonetheless to three signifi­
cant shortcomings. First, and most importantly, the process 
places the burden on the water right owner to keep apprised of 
applications filed, to bear the cost of engineering evalua­
tions necessary to determine the impact of a change upon his 
particular water right and to bear the cost of appearing as an 
objector, with legal representation, to put the applicant on 
his proof. Second, the State Engineer does not have the 
opportunity to employ the expertise of his office to get 
facts, to evaluate potential impacts, to secure terms and 
conditions to protect the river and to act in a parens patriae 
capacity on behalf of the water users. Finally, the very 
nature of a judicial proceeding, with all of its provisions
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for discovery and other opportunities for delay, assures water 
users that approval of a change cannot be expected in anything 
short of one to two years.
It would seem that the commendable objectives of the 
adjudication process could be achieved, without these short­
comings, if the State Engineer were given jurisdiction in the 
first instance to review applications, counsel with the appli­
cant on desired terms and conditions to protect the river, and 
enter a decision approving or rejecting the application.
Notice could be given of that determination, with a right of 
review by applicant or objectors. Where a hearing is held at 
the administrative level with opportunity for objectors to 
present evidence, review should be made on the administrative 
record pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
decision of the hearing officer should be overturned only if 
arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. If an administra­
tive decision is reached without an administrative record, 
review should be de novo.
In brief, this change would eliminate the referees in 
water court and substitute the State Engineer as the first 
decision officer. If one were to assume the worst, and all 
decisions of the State Engineer were appealed, we would have a 
no more costly or time-consuming exercise than we now have in 
water court, but we would have the additional advantage of an 
expert nonadversary hearing officer who would be capable of 
using available river and aquifer data from a growing data 
bank, and who would fashion a preliminary decree that would
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give the court a sounder basis for a decision than is 
generated in the adversary arena. But if the State Engineer 
were to play an active and effective role in investigating and 
evaluating proposals, and in the negotiation of protective 
terms and conditions, substantial protection would be given to 
water users without requiring their continual participation in 
basinwide water court proceedings.
The adoption of this system would, in all likelihood, 
result in more efficient allocation and administration of 
Colorado water resources. The owners of vested water rights 
would be freed from the costly burden of monitoring all appli­
cations for water rights and change of water rights, and the 
existing system would be streamlined so as to eliminate 
unnecessary duplication and the attendant expense and delay.
D. Need for Uniformity.
To the extent the General Assembly has used band-aid 
approaches to deal with special problems that have arisen in 
administration, it has lost the objectivity which is only 
available by a coordinated approach. For instance, in the 
Ground Water Management Act of 1965, a nontechnical commission 
was established to make policy decisions with respect to 
boundaries of designated basins, the creation of management 
districts, the measurement of aquifer life, determination of 
rate of development and the like. It placed the State 
Engineer on the commission but gave him no administrative 
authority. Its decisions as well as the State Engineer' s 
decisions are reviewable by the District Court in the judicial
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district where the land lies, not by the water court. In 
contrast, when Senate Bill 5 was enacted this year for 
nontributary groundwaters outside designated basins, policy 
was fixed by the legislature, special rules were enacted for 
the Denver Basin and no jurisdiction was given to the ground 
water commission. Appeals from State Engineer decisions 
pertaining to the Denver Basin would go to the water court 
under modified provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act; 
other appeals would go to the District Courts as before.
This seemingly illogical delegation of authority and 
responsibility creates needless confusion. What is right in 
one case should be right in others. If policy can be made by 
a commission, rather than by the State Engineer, it should be 
made uniformly. There frankly is no need for compartmentaliz­
ing water resources for separate administration and inconsis­
tent rules. Diversity continues to exist because special 
interest groups and certain self-serving legislative represen­
tatives have approached each issue with the intent to obtain 
an advantage for a particular group of water users.. The time 
has come for water administration to be viewed as a whole, 
decision authority to be centralized and administrative 
procedures to be compatible for all variations in water 
sources.
IV. OTHER STATE PATTERNS.
Without detailing the laws of each of our sister 
states, I will describe four patterns of administration that
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Colorado could well investigate.
A. The Preliminary Decree.
First is the use of a preliminary decree. Under this 
system, an application is made o the responsible agency. A 
preliminary decree is then fashioned on the basis of informa­
tion in the application, a report from the agency charged with 
analyzing all applications for decrees,40/ and applicable laws 
and compacts and other information the decision officer may 
collect. The decision is then served on interested parties or 
published in a form adequate to assure notice to all who might 
perceive they would be affected. If no objections are filed, 
the preliminary decree becomes final and is recorded; if an 
objection is filed, the objector must state specific grounds 
and evidence on which error is claimed. A hearing is then 
held either in the department or in court and, following such 
hearing, a final decree is entered.
If a judicial proceeding is required in order to join 
and bind the United States under the McCarren Act,41/ the 
action can be initiated in court, referred to the hearing 
officer, and then the preliminary decree can be entered by the 
court. Montana, with a permit system for initiation of water
40/ Public confidence in any administrative system requires 
that there be adequate, if not total, separation between the 
hearing officer and the agency which purports to provide an 
objective analysis of the proposed application. This could 
easily be accomplished by creating separate divisions within 
the agency to perform each function. ..
41/ 43 U.S.C. § 666.
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rights and historic practices of nonjudicial adjudication and 
administration, went to a judicial system in 1979 to permit 
compacts with Indian tribes and federal water rights to be 
adjudicated.42/ It did so in a form preserving the benefits 
of its historic administrative system. It confined eviden­
tiary proceedings to objections made to carefully sculpted 
preliminary decrees. Since we have water courts already 
established, Colorado could utilize such a system, by requir­
ing applications to be filed with the water court, which would 
then be referred to the State Engineer. A report would then 
be prepared regarding relevant hydrological considerations 
with data drawn from an ongoing data bank. The State Engineer 
would then prepare a preliminary decree which would be filed 
with the water judge and published and distributed in the same 
manner applications are now published and distributed. The 
water court could confine evidentiary proceedings to 
objections to the preliminary decree. The system would avoid 
routine litigation and duplication of hearings before the 
administrator and the court.
42/ R.C.M. 1983 § 85-2-211 et seq.
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B . Change Application Processing.
Procedures are fairly Uniform in appropriation states 
with respect to the investigation and processing of change 
applications. The McCarren Act does not waive sovereign 
immunity in such proceedings so it is unnecessary to use a 
court proceeding for jurisdictional purposes. Even where 
court proceedings may be employed in adjudication of priori­
ties,' the designated water official exercises complete juris­
diction over such changes. He reviews the application and, if 
change can be made without impairment of existing rights, the 
change is approved. If the state water official perceives 
there might be injury to others from the proposed change, 
notice is served personally or by publication so that 
interested parties may appear and participate. The state 
officer then makes a decision on the basis of an administra­
tive record, including his evaluation and report and any evi­
dence introduced by parties who appeared as the result of the 
published notice. His decision is final unless the applicant 
or objectors elect to appeal. If so, the trial court will 
take up the record as evidence subject to objections, allow 
additional evidence to be taken, give weight to the water 
officer's decision, thereby putting the burden on the objector 
to overturn, and render a final determination. With that type
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of system in New Mexico,43/ Utah 44/ and Wyoming,45/ the state 
administrator is given broad authority to promulgate rules and 
guidelines for the conduct of proceedings and the administra­
tion of priorities.
Such an approach would eliminate the most serious of 
Colorado's problems. It would permit the State Engineer to 
use the hydrological data bank as a foundation for analysis of 
injury, and would allow active participation by the State 
Engineer in negotiations between the applicant and objectors 
in an effort to protect existing rights. Moreover, it puts 
the State Engineer in a parens patriae position with 
responsibility for protecting the regimen of existing uses, 
yet gives any party an opportunity for an independent judicial 
hearing if aggrieved by arbitrary or unjust administrative 
action.46/
C. Groundwater Regimen.
The pattern developed in all states with identifiable 
groundwater reservoirs with limited rechargeability is four­
pronged. First, groundwater permitting and adjudication is
43/ Section 72-7-1 N.M.S.A. 1978.
44/ U.C.A. 1953 § 73-3-14 (Repl. Vol. 7C, 1980).
45/ W.S. 1977 § 41-4-401.
46/ One facet of the Montana statute that has appeal is the 
assessment of attorneys' fees against the losing party on 
appeal, if appeal is taken from an administrative order or 
preliminary decree. See R.C.M. 1983 § 85-2-125. Such a 
provision should make the administrator more sensitive to the 
defensibility of his decision and the objector a bit more 
cautious about appealing a decision.
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integrated into the general water management institution, and 
procedures for acquiring groundwater rights are frequently the 
same as for surface rights. Second, where diversions exceed 
recharge to an aquifer, the aquifer is designated to be 
critical, and new rights are limited to the quantity of 
recharge or augmentation provided. Third, local management is 
permitted over such aquifers to encourage conservation of 
water, exploration and development of recharge opportunities 
and control changes of beneficial use. However, even where 
local management and control exist, the State Engineer polices 
withdrawals under statutes, regulations and administrative 
orders. Finally, judicial review is generally limited to the 
standards of review provided by the Administrative Procedure 
Act. Colorado should take a hard look at the Arizona 
Act.47/ This approach was rejected by a majority of the 
Governor's interim study group on the grounds that the act has 
not solved all of Arizona's problems. But that approach would 
go far in avoiding the definitional issues raised by S.B. 5, 
provide uniformity of administration, define critical aquifers 
and permit drawdown and usage of each aquifer to be tailored 
to the characteristics of the aquifer.
D. Conservation and Elimination of Waste.
Finally, the statutes of Utah,48/ Wyoming,49/ New
47/ A.R.S. § 45-401 through § 45-637.
48/ U.S.A. 1953 § 73-5-9 (Repl. Vol. 7C, 1980) 
49/ W.S. 1977 § 41-3-603/
-36-
Mexico,50/ Washington 51/ and California 52/ confer broad 
powers on the water officials to take affirmative action to 
conserve water and eliminate waste in the application of water 
to beneficial use. Some states permit the appointment of 
water masters in limited areas and confer powers on engineers 
and water masters to get expedited relief in the form of 
injunctions and assessments of penalties from the courts.
While Colorado has expressed concern about water shortages, 
nonbeneficial usage of water and speculative activities, the 
General Assembly has refused to take the steps necessary to 
solve these problems. The General Assembly should define and 
enforce forfeiture of water rights for nonuse, grant authority 
to water officials to define and prevent waste and establish 
substantial penalties for violation of administrative or 
judicial orders.
50/ [Section 72-13-8 N.M.S.A. 1978]
51/ R.C.W. §§ 90.03.005, 90.44.110.
52/ Wests Ann. Cal. Water Code §§ 100, 275, 300-311.
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V. RECOMMENDATION.
All of the above-described procedures are preferable 
in my judgment to the existing Colorado procedure, not only 
from the viewpoint of the water user but more broadly from the 
viewpoint of the public. But in light of the self interest 
that maintains the existing archaic system, I see no 
likelihood that the present General Assembly will make any 
significant change in present procedures. I have been hard 
pressed to find a rational explanation for the anti-State 
Engineer syndrome that seems to be peculiar to this state.
The General Assembly has neither authorized nor funded that 
office to perform adequately the services which it is capable 
of providing to the water users of the state. As previously 
discussed, the State Engineer can make priority determinations 
and provide records for administration of priorities without 
need for complex judicial proceedings, with a right of appeal 
under the Administrative Procedure Act for those who feel that 
the agency has been arbitrary or capricious. He can protect 
the regimen of use on the river for the benefit of all water 
users and can monitor allocations to avoid or at least 
minimize waste. But far beyond those administrative roles, 
his office can facilitate decision-making by developing a data 
bank for each of the rivers and aquifers, use such data for 
evaluation of applications for change, needs for augmentation 
and effects of exchange and provide nonadversarial data for 
decision-making at minimal cost to water users. With such 
data, that office can further facilitate changes in water use
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by counseling proponents on impacts of proposed actions and 
alternatives to achieve their goal. It can conduct continuing 
studies of nontributary aquifers and, with authority, enlarge 
or control diversion rates and augmentation requirements to 
achieve conservation objectives. However, all of these 
functions require trained personnel and adequate technical 
support, which has not been forthcoming from the General 
Assembly.
Unfortunately, the General Assembly is not the only 
barrier to change. This state started on a court adjudicatory 
system in part by chance but initially of justifiable neces­
sity when records of appropriations were not otherwise avail­
able for administration. By the time that system came up for 
review in 1968-69, we had an entrenched legal and engineering 
fraternity that was dependent on the continuation of a 
judicial system of adjudication. Members of the water bar and 
engineering group had significant partisan roles in reviewing 
existing law and recommending revisions. The validity of this 
analysis is certainly confirmed by the fact that almost every 
change that has been recommended and adopted by the General 
Assembly has enlarged the judicial role, increased the cost of 
decision-making and increased the volume and complexity of the 
legal and hydrological determination which must be made in 
conjunction with the acquisition or change of a water right.
A change can occur only if a nonpartisan body makes a compara­
tive study of practices in other adjudication states in the 
west and in the eastern states that have converted to an
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appropriation system in recent years, and from such study 
measure: (i) the success of the comparative systems by the
volume of water litigation that is generated; (ii) the cost to 
water users of protecting the regimen of the river and their 
historic uses; (iii) the time required for decision-making; 
and (iv) the extent to which conservation of water resources 
and elimination of waste are recognized as management objec­
tives. What I therefore recommend is that a nonpolitical 
research organization be encouraged to prepare a white paper 
on water administration which addresses, from an analytical 
and political perspective, the administrative systems in our 
sister appropriation states.
I have no doubt that such a study will demonstrate 
that an administrative nonjudicial system will be more effec­
tive, less costly, less time-consuming and less susceptible to 
court-oriented disputes. Once such a white paper is prepared, 
and any proposal for change is carefully tied to protection of 
vested rights, I suspect a wide level of support will be found 
in the League of Women Voters, the American Water Resources 
Association, the Colorado Water Congress and similar groups. 
Once user support is generated, the fears of change will 
evaporate and pressure will be asserted for legislative 
action.
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